Monthly Review

Occupied Regions of Georgia: Review of Main Events and Trends

2023 / 12 / 04

Publication: N14 / Review Period: November 1-30, 2023

The review is being prepared within the framework of the Roadmap to the Kremlin's Policy in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region project. The purpose of the review is to provide readers with information about main events and trends in the occupied regions of Georgia. The review is a monthly publication and will be useful for decision-makers, public employees, media representatives and other people who are interested in the developments taking place in the occupied regions of Georgia.

Occupied Regions’ Response to the Prime Minister of Armenia

The occupied regions did not like a November 24 statement of the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, saying that Armenia “fully and unequivocally supports the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and democracy of Georgia.” This is how Pashinyan answered a question whether Armenia was ready to recognize Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region as Russian-occupied territories.

Abkhazia's de facto Leader, Aslan Bzhania, condemned Pashinyan's statement. He believes that such a statement from the Armenian leadership is due to the influence from the West. Bzhania called on the Armenian government to “abandon indoctrinated rhetoric and begin to take into account the actual state of affaires while implementing its foreign policy.” Members of the de facto parliament, namely four “deputies” of Armenian origin, also criticized Pashinyan's statement.

Pashinyan’s words did not go unanswered in Tskhinvali where de facto leader Alan Gagloyev reminded Pashinyan his defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. As Gagloyev said, “we respect the Armenian people with whom we have centuries-old relations; however, we are not interested in the opinion of the Prime Minister of Armenia who left Nagorno-Karabakh in a difficult situation.” Gagloyev accused Pashinyan of betraying his own people.

The assessments made by representatives of the occupied regions regarding Pashinyan’s statement fit into the Russian narrative believing that the defeat of the Armenian side in the Nagorno-Karabakh war occurred “at the expense” of Pashinyan. After the defeat in Karabakh, Pashinyan no longer considers Russia a guarantor of Armenia’s security and is trying to distance from Moscow’s influence. Consequently, he became the target of the Kremlin’s negative campaign.

Abkhazia

Control Over the Activities of International Organizations is Increasing

On November 16, an online conference was held at the media center of the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua and the de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tskhinvali region took part. The meeting discussed activities of Western non-governmental organizations and UN agencies. The parties shared their experience in fighting against the “destructive” influence of these organizations. Soon after the meeting, it became known that the de facto government made a new decision to increase control over the activities of international organizations.

Online Conference in the Media Center

On November 20, Bzhania signed a decree on amendments to the so-called Presidential Order N108 (adopted on May 4, 2019) on “the implementation of some measures of programs (projects) of international non-governmental and international organizations on the territory of the Republic of Abkhazia.” According to the de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inal Ardzinba, the amendment is aimed at “ensuring the transparency of their activities, protecting our sovereignty and national security.” As an example of the influence of Western organizations, Ardzinba cited the information published on USAID's official web-page which reads that projects being implemented in Abkhazia are aimed at “countering the destructive influence of the Kremlin” and “restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia.” Ardzinba added, that “for those who want to destroy Abkhaz-Russian relations and consider Abkhazia as an occupied territory, the door will be closed in the near future.”

For the last two years, Ardzinba has been actively trying to strengthen control over the activities of international organizations operating in Abkhazia. Despite numerous attempts, existing internal resistance did not allow the adoption of a law similar to the Russian law on “foreign agents.” However, Bzhania's amendment to the existing order creates a legal basis for more control over the activities of the mentioned organizations.

Who did Bzhania Meet in Moscow?

Bzhania visited Moscow twice in November. The first visit occurred on November 7 and he met with Rashid Nurgaliyev, the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council who supervises the occupied regions of Georgia in the Council. Information about the second visit was published on the web-page of Bzhania on November 22. According to the information, meetings were planned in various state structures; however, it is interesting that no info was disseminated about the meetings held during the visit. Bzhania's frequent and long visits to Moscow have long been a subject of discussion in Abkhazia. Representatives of the opposition and media suspect that Bzhania’s disappearance in Moscow is related to his personal affairs.

Enhanced Connection with Belarus

On November 6, at a meeting of the Public Council under the de facto Ministry, Ardzinba, summarized “Ministry’s” activity in the direction of Belarus. According to him, following a visit of the “government” delegation of Abkhazia to Belarus, an interdepartmental dialogue is underway. Ardzinba emphasized that the visit took place despite the increased opposition from Georgian diplomats. As per his assessment, diplomatic relations between Belarus and Georgia are on a downward trajectory which gives Ardzinba hope that Minsk will recognize the region soon.

In the context of relations with Belarus, it is interesting that Diana Pilia, the Deputy Chairperson of the so-called Constitutional Court of Abkhazia, met with the Deputy Chairperson of the Constitutional Court of Belarus, Nathalya Karpovich on November 17 in Minsk. The developed dynamics of mutual meetings and increased pressure from Moscow boost the likelihood that Belarus may recognize the independence of Abkhazia.

Electricity from Russia

According to the de facto Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Economy of Abkhazia, Kristina Ozgan, “no one can maintain Abkhazia's energy system, except ourselves.” As she noted, the region has been receiving electricity from Russia every year to eliminate the deficit created since 2016 and from November 5, 2023, Abkhazia receives electricity from Russia based on an agreement signed with Inter Rao. Ozgan considers the further increase of tariffs as an important lever for overcoming the crisis, which should be gradually done until 2025. The de facto government, in addition to raising tariffs, considers it important to attract Russian investors to the energy sector. Part of the population does not like this move as they believe that the alienation of the energy sector will weaken the sovereignty of the Abkhazs and increase Russia's leverage over them.

In Search of Georgian “Saboteurs”

On November 8, at 21:03, a Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov published a statement on his Telegram channel. Solovyov wrote that “a subversive group of up to 50 people moved to Abkhazia from Georgia.” He claimed that the goal of the subversive group was to organize a terrorist attack at the Sokhumi Airport. The de facto government conducted a search operation and on November 9, denied the presence of saboteurs. The credibility of the information was questioned in the local community from the beginning. The actual motive for spreading the disinformation is still unclear. Abkhazian society does not have an unambiguous answer either.

Searching for Saboteurs

Tskhinvali Region

Meeting in Ergneti

On November 1, the 115th meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Ergneti. A total of six such meetings have already been held in 2023. The meeting discussed various issues, including illegal detention Georgian citizens and “borderization,” 24-hour operation of the so-called crossing checkpoints and dismantling of the Georgian police checkpoint in the village of Chorchana.

Unlike Ergneti, similar meetings does not occur in Gali after 2018, the restoration of which has been actively demanded by the Abkhaz side for the last period. Although there is no official consent of Tbilisi on this issue, in an interview to the local media, the so-called Head of the Gali region, Konstantin Pilia, said that a special space is already being arranged near the occupation line, where the meetings will be held.

Meeting in Ergneti

Murder of Tamaz Ginturi and Responses of Moscow and Tskhinvali

The Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Maria Zakharova, responded to the case of a Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi who was killed by representatives of the occupation forces near the village of Kirbali (Gori municipality). She expressed surprise at the reaction of the European Union to the fact that a Georgian citizen illegally crossed the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia. According to her, obvious facts and Tskhinvali's explanations are ignored, and Brussels is trying to blame Russia for the incident with no appeal.

Representatives of the de facto government also spread their version of Ginturi's murder. The so-called State Security Committee stated that “a border squad came accross two violators of the state border who were in a state of inebriation. During their arrest, they resisted, which threatened the life and health of the border guards. At the same time, the violators used an axe. Later they tried to hit the border guards with a car. In order to prevent illegal actions, the border guards fired a warning shot, and after the disobedience, shot the car’s wheels. As a result, one violator received a serious wound and was transferred to Georgia for emergency medical assistance, while the other was arrested.”

The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement on Ginturi's murder, which referred to Ginturi and the detainee Levan Dotiashvili, who was released on November 9, as “representatives of the radical party of the former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili.” According to Tskhinvali, the incident is primarily caused by the fact that Tbilisi does not recognize the so-called state border. That's why they call on Tbilisi to start the process of delimitation and demarcation of the so-called state border.

Visit of a Government Official

On November 17, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian government, Alexander Novak, visited the occupied Tskhinvali region. Novak oversees the direction of the occupied regions of Georgia. This was his first visit to the region where he participated in the 22nd meeting of the “Intergovernmental Commission on socio-economic cooperation” between Russia and the de facto republic. Moscow often points out to Tskhinvali that Russian funds must be spent correctly, and a visit of such a high level should be viewed in light of control over the spending of Russian money by the de facto authorities.

The 22nd Meeting of the “Intergovernmental Commission”

Fuel Smuggling

On November 15, five smugglers were arrested in the Tskhinvali region, who were illegally pumping fuel from the occupied region to the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia, the other side of the occupation line. According to the so-called State Security Committee, the detainees disguised a pipeline for the transportation of fuel, through which “a large amount of fuel was illegally delivered to a potential adversary.” It was especially emphasized that such an action was carried out in the conditions of temporary restrictions on the export of oil products in Russia and the fuel shortage in the region. This is the first case publicized in recent years which was related to illegal economic activity on the occupation line. It’s a fact that the Ossetian “smugglers” had “partners” on the other side of the occupation line and thus the case acquires larger-scale nature.

New “Budget”

In 2024, the “budget” of the Tskhinvali region will be RUB 8 billion 836, taking into account the volume of financial assistance provided by the Russian Federation in the amount of RUB 7 billion 35 million which includes RUB 5 billion 942 thousand assistance for socio-economic development, and RUB 1 billion 93 million for the purpose of implementing budget investments. In this regard, the situation in the Tskhinvali region is unchanged. Unlike Abkhazia, part of whose “budget” is replenished with its own revenues, the Tskhinvali region remains completely dependent on Russia’s financing.​