Author: Elene Mindiashvili

Below article discusses the situation at the occupation line in 2023, provides statistics of displacement, “borderization” and illegal detentions of Georgian citizens near the occupation line for 2023, their qualitative characteristics and main trends.

The review is partly based on information available in open sources of the occupied regions as well as information published by de facto government structures. In many cases, the available data can serve propaganda purposes and the interests of the de facto authorities of the occupied regions, and therefore cannot be fully credible and objective.

Movement on the Occupation Line

Movement between the occupied regions and the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia is possible through border checkpoints (BCPs). BCPs are located along the occupation line (referred to as the “state border” in the occupied regions). Since 2009, the Border Division of the Federal Security Service (FSS) of Russia “guards” the occupation line.

Prior to the tightening of “border” control by the Border Division of the Russian FSS, there were a total of six BCPs connecting to Abkhazia and four - to the Tskhinvali region. Currently, it’s possible to move between Abkhazia and the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia only through one - Enguri border checkpoint, and in the case of the Tskhinvali region there are valid two - Perevi-Kardzmani and Odzisi-Mosabruni BCPs. The de facto authorities of the occupied regions consider the use of other border checkpoints “illegal.”

More details about BCPs read here: #1, #2.

It is especially interesting to observe the trend of movement at the BCP connecting to the Tskhinvali region. In August 2019, after the opening of the Georgian police checkpoint in the village of Chorchana, movement between the Tskhinvali region and the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia through the BCPs was restricted. BCPs partially resumed operation only in August 2022, when Alan Gagloyev was elected as a new de facto president of the occupied Tskhinvali region. Effective August 2022, residents of the occupied regions are allowed to cross the Perevi-Kardzmani and the Odzii-Mosabruni BCPs during the last ten days of each month.

Graph #1: Statistics of movement through the Odzisi-Mosabruni and the Perevi-Kardzmani BCPs in the first half of 2023.

Graph #1 presents statistics of the movement of citizens through two border checkpoints connecting to the Tskhinvali region for the first half of 2023: Perevi-Kardzmani (connecting Sachkhere municipality with the occupied Java region) and Odzisi-Mosabruni (connecting Dusheti municipality with the occupied Akhalgori municipality). As can be seen from the graph, the lowest traffic volumes through both BCPs were observed in February, while the highest intensity was observed at the Perevi-Kardzmani BCP in March, and at the Odzisi-Mosabrun BCP in June. The chart shows that many more people use the Odzisi-Mosabruni BCP than the Perevi-Kardzmani BCP. This is explained by the fact that usually more people travel from Akhalgori to and from the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia than from Java.

Illegal Detentions in the Occupied Abkhazia

According to the 2023 data of the de facto State Security Service (SSS), more than 700 violators of Abkhazia's “border legislation” were arrested on the Enguri River, criminal cases were initiated against 15 persons under Article 324 of the “Criminal Code of the Republic of Abkhazia,” and the remaining violators were brought to the court under Articles 1901and 1902  of the “Civil Code of the Republic of Abkhazia.” The de facto agency does not report the circumstances of all these cases, however, as noted in the statement, a total of 30 attempts to transport various types of smuggled goods were prevented. In one case, more than 900 packs of tobacco products and nine pieces of equipment needed to generate cryptocurrencies were found in a vehicle entering occupied Abkhazia from the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia.

Illegal Detentions in the Occupied Tskhinvali Region

Graph #2: 2022-2023 Statistics of Illegal Detentions

According to the information spread in open sources, in 2023, the occupation forces illegally detained 31 citizens of Georgia, which is almost two times higher than the same figure in 2022. In 2022, the illegal detention of 17 citizens was reported.

Last year, most of the detention cases by the occupation forces were recorded on the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. Citizens were detained while performing various activities, and were taken to the nearest military base or directly to Tskhinvali prison. The allegations mainly concern so-called “illegal” border crossings. In some cases, citizens actually crossed the occupation line and traveled to the territory controlled by the de facto government to visit relatives and family members who remained there. The occupation regime uses the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for legal proceedings. Illegal detainees are mostly tried for “violation of the state border,” which corresponds to article 322 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In 2023, July was notable for the number of cases, while no illegal detentions were recorded in April and December.

We can classify illegal detentions in 2023 under several categories:

1. Illegal detentions of Georgian citizens on the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia;
2. Illegal detentions of Georgian citizens on the territory of the occupied region;
3. Detentions of “citizens” living in the Tskhinvali region traveling from the occupied region to the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia.

A section of the occupation line in Gori municipality standed out in terms of frequency of detentions, although citizens were also detained near occupation line sections in Sachkhere, Kareli, Dusheti, Tskhinvali, Akhalgori, Tigvi and Eredvi municipalities.

Out of the 31 reported cases of detention of Georgian citizens, a total of 23 were recorded on the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia, and seven - in the occupied Tskhinvali region. The de facto State Security Committee disseminates information about the detentions of “citizens” living in the Tskhinvali region traveling from the Tskhinvali region to the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. The statement says that 251 “citizens” violated the “border regime.”

On November 6, 2023, in the courtyard of the Lomisa Church of St. Goerge, in the village of Kirbali (Gori municipality), representatives of the occupation forces killed with several gunshots a Georgian citizen, a resident of Kirbali, Tamaz Ginturi. The murder caused a great international resonance. The European Parliament adopted a 5-point resolution condemning the murder of Ginturi, the European MPs demanded a thorough investigation into the case, punishment of the perpetrators and release of other Georgian citizens who remain in illegal captivity.

As of December 31, 2023, a tital of six Georgian citizens remained in illegal detention in Tskhinvali prison. The names of only four of them are known: Soso Dvalishvili, Lasha Khetereli, Giorgi Meladze and Dimitri Korinteli.

As of February 19, 2024, eight Georgian citizens are in illegal detention. The identity of the citizen detained in January 2024 is still unknown.

Graph #3: Duration of detentions of illegally detained persons and detention cases by villages

Graph #4: Locations of illegal detentions and homicide in 2023

See the interactive map of illegal detentions prepared by the Rondel Foundation here.

“Borderization”

Last year, in addition to the cases of illegal detentions, the so-called “borderization” process was also underway. During 2023, a total of 13 “borderization” cases were recorded in sections of seven different municipalities. This number is less than the same data for 2022 and 2021. In 2022, 15 “borderization” cases and in 2021, 20 cases were reported in open sources.

Last year, at various times, there were cases of renewing old barbed wire or passing new ones, the facts of digging new fire protection ditches or renewing old ones, the occupation forces intensively expanded the checkpoints located in the vicinity of the occupation line, on the occupied territory, and built various military facilities, placed various types of installations such as “border” banners, surveillance cameras, parking lots for special vehicles, etc.

It should be noted that the “borderization” process in 2023 was qualitatively different from the same process in 2022. Last year, the occupation line was not drawn in the direction of the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. The list of municipalities where the “borderization” process took place is also different. It is obvious that the strategy of the de facto government has changed, which may be due to various factors.

Graph #5: “Borderization” statistics for 2022-2023

The de facto authorities of the occupied region and the Russian FSS may have only temporarily stopped the process of annexing new territories and are trying to strengthen their positions in the already occupied areas through the construction of capital checkpoints. On the other hand, the lack of human resources and equipment can cause delays in the “borderization” process. This is against the backdrop that a significant part of the Russian occupation forces is dispatched to fight in Ukraine.

And finally, since the mentioned review and the given statistical data are mostly based on the information disseminated in open sources, information about all the facts of “borderization” may not be available. 

Graph #6: Locations of “borderization” cases in 2023.

See the interactive map of “borderization” processes prepared by the Rondel Foundation here.

“Smuggling”

Last year, one attempt of illegally transporting fuel from the Tskhinvali region to the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia was recorded. On November 15, 2023, five people were detained in the occupied Tskhinvali region for pumping 50 tons of fuel into territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. According to the de facto Security Committee, these individuals used an inoperable reclamation system in which they installed a pipe and pumped fuel through it. The so-called Committee assessed this action as “illegal supply of fuel and lubricants to a potential enemy which they can use for military purposes.” It was especially emphasized that such an action is being carried out under conditions of temporary restrictions on the export of petroleum products in Russia and a fuel shortage in the region.