Author: Arsen Araqelov

On February 24, 2024, two years passed since the start of Russia's full-scale military aggression in Ukraine. The ongoing war in Ukraine has a great impact on the Russian-occupied regions of Georgia which somehow participate in the Kremlin's military campaign. The below publication discusses how the occupied regions have been involved in Russia's military aggression during the last two years, what are the actions of the de facto governments, as well as the attitudes and expectations of the population.

First Response

Recognition of the Self-Proclaimed People's Republics - Response of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali

The beginning of 2022 was marked by internal political tensions in the occupied regions. The Tskhinvali region was preparing for illegitimate presidential elections which was to take place in April. The acting de facto President, Anatoly Bibilov, was opposed by the leader of the Nykhas Party, Alan Gagloyev. Abkhazia was preparing for “parliamentary elections.” The current de facto president, Aslan Bzhania, needed to win the “elections” and strengthen his influence. Russia's statements and subsequent full-scale military aggression also had an impact on the “election” process. Political groups tried to use this issue for their political purposes.

On February 20, when the situation was escalating, Bzhania issued a statement that, if necessary, the Republic of Abkhazia was ready to provide military and humanitarian aid to Donbas.

On February 21, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, signed a resolution that provides for the recognition of the “independence and sovereignty” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Following the recognition, Putin instructed the Russian Armed Forces to take appropriate actions to maintain peace in Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

Bzhania welcomed Putin's decision. According to him, “the people of Donbas have been facing difficult trials for years, as a result of which the population is forced to leave their homes and seek refuge in Russia.” Bzhania called Putin's decision fair and relevant to modern challenges, threats, and geopolitical reality.

After the recognition by Moscow, occupied Abkhazia also recognized the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. It should be noted that the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics recognized Abkhazia in 2015, although no such decision was made by Abkhazia until Russia recognized the separatist republics. The Tskhinvali region recognized the People's Republics in 2014, and several agreements were concluded between them since then. Reportedly, the de facto government of the Tskhinvali region made this decision on the instruction of Russia, thus the Kremlin created an illegal mechanism for economic relations with the separatist republics.

Like Bzhania, the then “President” of the Tskhinvali region, Bibilov, responded to Putin's decision and expressed his support for Russia. Bibilov stated that “instead of dialogue, Donbas saw more and more acts of inhumanity on the verge of genocide” for years.

February 24 - the First Day of the War

A few hours after the start of Russia's full-scale military aggression in Ukraine, at 07:30 am, Bibilov announced a combat alert in the so-called Ministry of Defense. By his order, all units of the “Ministry” moved to a barrack position, and in a few hours, Bibilov convened an emergency session of the “Security Council” where he ordered the creation of an operational headquarters. Bibilov stated that all the tasks issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense would be extended to the Ministry of Defense of the de facto republic.

Bibilov instructed the so-called State Security Committee to activate counter-intelligence activities, to implement “necessary actions for monitoring the border and the territory adjacent to Georgia” together with the Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russia, and get ready “to respond to all possible provocations from the Georgian side.”

Bibilov urged the so-called Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish relations with Russian “colleagues.” After that, he addressed the population of the region and expressed his support for Russia's “special military operation.” He asked the “political forces” not to strain the internal situation and also mentioned the upcoming “presidential elections.” Bibilov said that everyone should work together to ensure that the “elections” take place in a peaceful environment.

Accepting Refugees

On February 25, the de facto Republic of Abkhazia received 93 refugees from the Donetsk and Luhansk districts. The de facto Minister of Emergency Situations, Lev Kvitsinia, informed journalists about the operation.

According to Kvitsinia, on Bzhania's order, he mobilized one ambulance and two buses. The rescue team transported a total of 93 people to Abkhazia, including 49 children and one pensioner. When asked by journalists how many refugees Abkhazia could shelter, Kvitsinia replied that 200-300 more people could be accepted.

The rescue team crossed the so-called border between Russia and Abkhazia at 12 noon. All refugees were accommodated in the Aitar boarding house in Sokhumi.

Accepted Refugees

Attitudes in Society

Russia's military aggression in Ukraine was supported by the Abkhaz and Ossetian “political elite;” “deputy candidates” participating in the TV debates assessed the developments in the same way; The only difference was the restraint in the responses and the various assessments voiced in the communities.

Bzhania's statement resulted diverse of opinions in the Abkhaz society. Obviously, no one doubted the de facto republic's support to Russia, although some focused on possible risks and fears, and called Bzhania's statement premature.

The political debate in the social media united people respected by the Abkhaz society. Yuri Anchabadze's post, which criticized both Putin's decision and Bzhania's actions, received a great response. Anchabadze is a doctor of history working in Moscow. According to him, “one cannot act rashly following the status of a strategic ally,” thus criticizing Bzhania's quick and unconditional support for Putin. He expressed fear that “the current Putin-Lavrov’s policy in the direction of Ukraine is devastating and destructive” for Russia itself. “Abkhazia and Donbas are two different historical and geopolitical cases, Russia's recognition in 2008 was an act of restoration of historical justice.” “Now Russia will have to pay for it, so don't drag Abkhazia into Donbas affairs" - he wrote.

Public figures living in Abkhazia and members of the de facto parliament responded to the mentioned statement. They uttered statements usual for Russian propaganda such as “Ukrainian fascism.” At the same time, it was noted in Abkhazia that Georgia was “involved in the developments in Donbas” and many Georgians were killed there. The region also remembered and noted the support of the Ukrainian government to Georgia during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war “to destroy the people of Abkhazia and Ossetia,” and the war initiated by Russia was traditionally assessed as the end of the “collective fascism.”

Despite Tbilisi's peace-loving statements, Abkhazia viewed the rallies in support of Ukraine there not as a manifestation of pacifism, but as an aggression towards Russia. There were calls to close the so-called border to the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia. In addition, part of the population called on the de facto government to negotiate with the Russian government, which could theoretically dispatch its soldiers dislocated at the 4th and 7th military bases in the regions to Ukraine and leave the “border” unprotected, which partially happened. In March 2022, video footage of convoys of military equipment and personnel from Tskhinvali heading to the front appeared.   

Military Convoys Heading to the Front Line from Tskhinvali

Military Involvement of the Occupied Regions in the Russian Aggression

After the start of Russia's full-scale military aggression in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, representatives of the occupied regions of Georgia are also fighting on the side of Russia. Most of them have been involved in military operations since the beginning of the war, and some have been fighting in Ukraine since 2014. The following military groups can be distinguished: Piatnashka - ethnically Abkhaz fighters mainly make up the so-called Piatnashka international brigade; Storm Ossetia and Alania - the largest number of ethnic Ossetians are enlisted in these two formations; Russian Armed Forces – a number of ethnically Ossetian and Abkhaz fighters are fighting in Ukraine under the Russian Armed Forces, and some of them have been involved in hostilities as servicemen of the 4th and 7th Russian military bases stationed in the occupied regions; Wagner - a small number of volunteers are members of the private military company Wagner; Armed Forces of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics - Abkhaz and Ossetian volunteers also join the Armed Forces of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

Number of Combatants Involved in the War

The exact number of fighters who left the occupied regions for Ukraine is unknown. On October 15, 2023, the former de facto President of the Tskhinvali region, Anatoly Bibilov, said that more than 1,100 volunteers from the region participated in Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Considering the population of the Tskhinvali region (according to the 2019 census published by the de facto government, approximately 57 thousand people live in the Tskhinvali region, although real number of residents of the region is much less), these data may be exaggerated. As per reports in the Ossetian media, including Telegram channels, 30 fighters from the Tskhinvali region were killed in the war.

In the case of Abkhazia, the number of fighters involved in the conflict is unknown, although according to various reports, about 100 militants are fighting in Ukraine. As for the number of dead, according to an October 23, 2023 statement of the de facto Minister of Emergency Situations, Lev Kvitsinia, the remains of ten fighters were transferred from Ukraine to Abkhazia. After the announcement until today, the so-called Ministry returned four more dead fighters to Abkhazia.

On February 21, 2024, in an interview to the Russian news agency TASS, Bzhania stated that currently 70-80 ethnical Abkhaz fighters were fighting in Ukraine. Bzhania also spoke about the dead fighters, as per his reports a total of 20 fighters from Abkhazia died in the war.

Number of Dead Fighters

Regardless of the information disseminated by the de facto governments or the “official” Abkhaz and Ossetian media, open sources report that the number of fighters from the occupied regions who died in the war since February 24, 2022 is higher: a total of 39 fighters died from the Tskhinvali region, and 23 - from Abkhazia (March 15, 2024 data).

The interactive map created within the framework of the Rondeli Foundation’s project – Roadmap to Kremlin's Policy in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Rregion, presents those fighters who died during Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine. The map contains information about all the fighters who are connected to Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region.

Interactive Maps

Humanitarian and Technical Assistance

In addition to the fighters, the de facto governments of the occupied regions also declare their support for Russia, which is manifested in financial, humanitarian and technical assistance. In this regard, the involvement of the de facto President of the Tskhinvali region, Alan Gagloyev, who periodically goes to the front to meet with Ossetian fighters, is particularly noteworthy. One of the reasons for Gagloyev's activity is to oppose his predecessor, the former de facto president of the region, Anatoly Bibilov, who is trying to take revenge in the “parliamentary elections” (scheduled for June 2024) with his involvement in Russia's military aggression.

Charity concerts and events organized by the de facto governments, Russian compatriots living in the regions and the Federal Agency for CIS States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Affairs (hereinafter - Russian House) are periodically held in the occupied regions. Residents, school administrations, teachers and students widely take part in the events.

Concerts are held in the regions, famous singers dedicate songs to the fighters, and it is quite a popular activity to involve school children in the preparation of “camouflage nettings” for the fighters, which are then sent to the front. It is worth noting that to immortalize the memory of the fighters from the regions who died in the war, schools where they studied are named after them.

The Russian House offices and Russian compatriots in the regions are actively involved in the organization of various cultural events. Compatriots, especially in Abkhazia, have registered many different organizations, which, with the involvement of Russian House, conduct various supporting events. The “United Headquarters for Assistance and Support of Donbas” is actively operating. The headquarter includes “Cossack” organizations of Russian compatriots who have been sending various aid to the front, including technical and military equipment, since the beginning of the war.

A Telegram channel – “СВОИХ НЕ БРОСАЕМ” was created to support Piatnashka. Administrators of this group, who have a direct connection with the fighters of the brigade, periodically publish a list of the inventory that the fighters need. The list mainly includes items such as quadcopters, thermal imaging devices, drones, walkie-talkies, heaters, batteries, cars and various appliances.

List of Inventory to be Sent to Piatnashka

Involvement of the De Facto Leaders

Aslan Bzhania often publishes statements in support of ethnic Abkhaz fighters and often notes that “he is on their side.” Although he has a strained relations with the leader of Piatnashka, Avidzba, Bzhania often helps the brigade and its fighters from his personal funds.

In the case of Gagloyev, the internal political struggle is also evident. Unlike Bzhania, he is even more trying to help ethnic Ossetian fighters participating in the war, which is manifested both in trips to the front and sending cars to the fighters which he bought with his own money. Gagloyev has visited the front many times, bringing drones and mostly Niva cars. He is reportedly in active contact with the fighters and fulfills their requests. This is primarily due to the activities of the former de facto president of the Tskhinvali region, Anatoly Bibilov, in the fighting operations. Bibilov himself is an active participant of Russia's military aggression and periodically publishes videos from the front, which he uses for “election” purposes.

Alan Gagloyev at the Front and His Gift - Pickup

It should be noted that Bibilov has received a number of combat medals for his participation in the war. In February 2024, he received the title of “Hero” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic. Before that, in August 2023, he was awarded with the Order for Courage, Russian state award. Bibilov is also an adviser to the Commander of the Expedition Volunteer Fighting Corps in the military-political direction.