Publication: N17 / Review Period: March 1-31, 2024

The review is being prepared within the framework of the Roadmap to the Kremlin's Policy in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region project. The purpose of the review is to provide readers with information about main events and trends in the occupied regions of Georgia. The review is a monthly publication and will be useful for decision-makers, public employees, media representatives and other people who are interested in the developments taking place in the occupied regions of Georgia.

Abkhazia

Note from Moscow

On March 13, the Abkhaz Telegram channel (Абхазский портал) and YouTube channel (Апсны Хабар) published a February 8 dated note which the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia. The note referres to the transfer of the Bichvinta State Country House to Russia and expresses dissatisfaction with a “constitutional law” adopted by the de facto parliament, according to which Russia does not have the right to transfer ownership of the Bichvinta State Country House and its adjacent territory and sea area to the third party. Moscow is also unhappy with the fact that Sokhumi reserves the right to denounce the agreement.

Note of the Russian Foreign Ministry

The de facto parliament ratified the agreement on the transfer of the Bichvinta State Country House to Russia on December 27, 2023. At the same time, it adopted a “law” prohibiting the transfer of facilities located on the transferred territory, adjacent territory and sea area to the third party. The restriction adopted by the de facto parliament was due to the sentiments in Abkhazia where part of society and political groups consider the transfer of the country house to Russia as weakening “sovereignty” and they fear that the “best part” of Abkhazia may end up in the ownership of a Russian oligarch.

Interestingly, the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not disseminate information about the note for which the de facto agency became the object of criticism. The de facto Foreign Minister, Inal Ardzinba, expressed dissatisfaction with the disclosure of the note and said that a working group was set up to work on the response note.

In Abkhazia, they suspect that the note received from Russia may lead to a change in the “constitutional law.” On March 14, the speaker of the de facto parliament, Lasha Ashuba, called the reports disinformation.

On March 25, a member of the de facto parliament, Inar Gitsba, made interesting statement about renouncing his “deputy” mandate. He is one of the opponents of the ratification of the agreement on the transfer of the Bichvinta State Country House to Russia.

Bzhania’s Meetings in Moscow

On March 19, the de facto President, Aslan Bzhania, met with the Head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Anton Vaino. Dmitry Kozak, Vaino’s deputy who supervises the occupied regions, also took part in the meeting. On March 20, Bzhania met with the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Rashid Nurgaliyev, who oversees the occupied regions in the Security Council. Bzhania’s visit ended on March 27. He paid a visit to Russia in February as well.

Abkhazia’s Foreign Activity

• On March 5, the “Ambassador” of Abkhazia in Syria, Muhammad Ali, met with the Ambassador of Venezuela, Jose Biomorga, at the Venezuelan Embassy in Syria. During the month, Ali also met with representatives of the Syrian government: the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and the Minister of Transport. Ali also met with Patriarch of the Melkite Greek Catholic Church of Antioch and the whole East, the Governor of Damascus and the Head of the Central Bank. Abkhaz “diplomacy” whose purpose is to strengthen ties in the Middle East is especially active in Syria.

Meeting between Muhammad Ali and the Governor of Damascus

• On March 1-7, Abkhaz and Ossetian diplomats took part in the 7th Global Forum of Young Diplomats – Diplomats in the Era of a Multipolar World. The forum was part of the World Youth Festival, which was held on the Sirius Federal Territory, Russia. At the forum, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, delivered a speech. Inal Ardzinba stated that “Abkhazia does not want a conflict with Georgia, but in the event of the return of Georgian radicals fighting on the side of Kyiv, different scenarios cannot be ruled out.”  
• On March 7, the de facto Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Irakli Tuzhba, met with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Transnistrian separatist republic, Alexander Stetsyuk. There are intense relations between Sokhumi and Tiraspol, which is evident in frequent meetings and statements made by their representatives.
• On March 12, Inal Ardzinba met with Ge Zhili and discussed the issue of promoting the tourism potential of Abkhazia in China. According to various sources, Zhili holds the status of “Honorary Consul of Abkhazia” in China, and his name has been repeatedly associated with Abkhazia in the past. On March 14, Zhili as the Chairman of the  board of the Beijing Information and Consulting Company Limited Liability “Eurasia,” signed a strategic framework agreement on “cooperation with the Abkhaz State University.”

Meeting Between Inal Ardzinba and Ge Zhili

• On March 13, the de facto Prime Minister, Alexander Ankvab, met with representatives of the Abkhaz diaspora living in Lebanon. On March 14, the speaker of the de facto parliament also hosted them.
• On March 15, Inal Ardzinba and his adviser Edgar Gvazava discussed the prospects for establishing relations with the United Arab Emirates. Ardzinba noted that Russia is helping to establish relations, while Georgia is hindering them. According to him, work is underway to organize a visit of the Abkhaz delegation to the Emirates. Recently, Ardzinba has often spoken about the development of relations with the Emirates, which may indicate that some connections already exist in this regard.

Sokhumi Dislikes the UNDP Response

On February 29, Inal Ardzinba summoned Vardon Khoja, the Manager of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and informed that no later than March 7, he expects the UNDP to refute on its official website the information published on the USAID website as well as publish information indicating a list of Abkhaz information resources funded by the UNDP. The Ardzinba agency did not consider the response published by UNDP satisfactory and reserved the right to “take adequate and timely response measures” in the event of “obvious concealment of information.” In recent months, USAID and UNDP have become a particular target of Ardzinba, which should be seen in the context of the fight against Western organizations. To date, it has not been possible to pass a “law” on “foreign agents,” although statements addressed to Western organizations have become more frequent.

Government Official Visits Sokhumi

On March 25, the Deputy Minister of Economic Development of Russia, Dmitry Volvach, visited Abkhazia. Volvach oversees the implementation of Russian-funded projects in Abkhazia and periodically visits the occupied region. Volvach also inspected the work ongoing on the territory of Sokhumi Airport. The Russian company will invest RUB 12 billion in the airport restoration project. According to Volvach, Abkhazia will receive a total of RUB 5.6 billion in financial assistance from Russia in 2024.

Reconstruction of Sokhumi Airport and Eviction of Residents

On March 13, Aslan Bzhania held a meeting of the coordination headquarters on the reconstruction of the airport. At this stage, the mobilization of construction equipment and working personnel is underway. The runway is being cleaned and repaired and old buildings are being dismantled. They hope to begin flights from the airport by the end of the year. If the airport is put into operation, international flights from Sokhumi will not be possible, since the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) does not recognize Sokhumi Airport as international one.

There may be some delay in the airport reconstruction due to the eviction of residents from the surrounding area. Several dozen families in the village of Babushara refuse to leave their homes and move to another place. On its part, a representative of the de facto government, the de facto First Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Energy and Transport, Jansug Nanba, states that the reports about the eviction of the population are not true. At the same time, he stated that the existing territory is not enough for the construction of a modern international airport, and a development plan, the so-called second phase, is being discussed. According to Nanba, the airport expansion plan is due to the fact that part of the airport infrastructure was transferred to structures of the de facto Ministry of Defense of Abkhazia and the Russian Armed Forces.

“Special Services” Report

Aslan Bzhania learned the 2023 report of the de facto Head of the State Security Service, Temur Akhiba. According to Akhiba, the main focus of their work in 2023 was “countering political extremism and the activities of non-governmental and international organizations funded by unfriendly countries and intelligence agencies.” Akhiba's report reflects the sentiments of the de facto government which attempts to limit the influence of Western organizations in Abkhazia.

Verdict for Triple Murder  

On March 14, the “Supreme Court” handed down a verdict in a triple murder that occurred on the Sokhumi beach in 2019. The case has been pending since April 2021. The five defendants were sentenced to various prison terms. The case concerns the shooting which occurred on November 22, 2019 on the Makhadzhiri embankment near the San Remo restaurant in Sokhumi. As a result, two persons belonging to the criminal underworld, Astamur Shamba (Astik) and Alkhas Avidzba (Khasik), as well as a restaurant employee Dominika Akirtava, were killed. The process is not yet completed since the verdict of the “Supreme Court” can be appealed.

The murder incited a political crisis. On December 2, 2019, the de facto Prosecutor General and the Minister of Internal Affairs resigned. In January 2020, Raul Khajimba, the de facto president, also left the office ahead of schedule. One of the organizers of the protest against Khajimba was Akhra Avidzba, a relative of the deceased crime boss, who is now participating in Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine.

Tskhinvali Region

Moscow Refuses the Accession of the Tskhinvali Region to Russia

On March 17, in an interview with RIA Novosti, the speaker of the de facto parliament of the Tskhinvali region, Alan Alborov, stated that “South Ossetia will discuss the issue of joining Russia in close coordination with Moscow, taking into account our bilateral relations and agreements.” The issue of joining Russia periodically becomes relevant on which de facto leaders also comment. In 2023, while presenting the annual report, the de facto President, Alan Gagloyev, expressed the hope that they will soon join Russia.

At this stage, Moscow is refraining from approving the accession request. In May 2022, the Russian Presidential Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that Moscow “does not plan to take any steps towards the reunification of the republic.” On March 21, Konstantin Kosachev, the Deputy Speaker of the Federal Council of the Russian Federation, commented on the issue. “The process of integration with South Ossetia, up to its entry into Russia, should not be artificially turned in one direction or the other; the current format of relations between the two independent states meets their interests,” he said. At this stage, by refusing to annex the occupied region, Moscow is trying to demonstrate goodwill towards Tbilisi, since against the backdrop of Western sanctions, Moscow characterizes the position of the Georgian government as pragmatic.

Why were “Deputies” Deprived of Russian Citizenship?

Three members of the de facto parliament: Gary Muldarov, David Sanakoev and Dzambolat Medoev, may be deprived of Russian citizenship. According to the “deputies,” on February 29, they received a notification from the Russian FSS dated February 7. As per the document, the decision was due to “actions contributing to increased tension near the Russian border.” The document does not specify what exactly these actions were.

All three “deputies” supported the establishment of a “state border” with Georgia. Muldarov was the Head of the “Commission on Delimitation and Demarcation of the Border.” The Hague International Criminal Court also issued an arrest warrant for Sanakoev for his war-related activities in August 2008.

The de facto President, Alan Gagloyev, also commented on the issue on March 11. He explained what led to such a situation and what kind of joint work was carried out with Russian colleagues around the issue of the so-called state border. According to him, “it all started with the activities of the State Commission for Delimitation and Demarcation of the State Border of the Republic of South Ossetia with Georgia, which was created by his predecessor Anatoly Bibilov and headed by Gary Muldarov.” As Gagloyev stated, “the documentation prepared by the commission was sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry. This issue was discussed in the region as well.” According to him, “when the situation began to develop faster, a direct question arose: why were working groups created if individual comrades are unilaterally trying to make changes to the border law?” Gagloyev said that “he repeatedly told the deputies that their actions threaten national security.” “All three have Russian passports, and no one has taken them away yet,” he added. 

On March 29, the de facto parliament sent an appeal to the Russian Federation Council and the State Duma on the issue. Members of the party of the former de facto President, Anatoly Bibilov, did not support the appeal. “Deputies” associate Moscow’s decision with the active “Georgian lobby” in Russia. There is an opinion that activity in defining the “border” will lead to aggravation of relations with the Georgian side. At this stage, this is not in Russia’s interests, which, in the backdrop of Western sanctions, is developing relations with Georgia.

EAEU Tariff

On March 29, the de facto parliament ratified a protocol on the transition to the EAEU Unified Customs Tariff and Russian Customs Duties. The protocol was signed on February 7, 2023. As per the decision, the Tskhinvali region will use the EAEU Unified Customs Tariff and Russian Customs Duties. Goods imported from Russia will not be subject to a single customs tariff. There was a danger that such a decision would lead to an increase in prices for goods, but since this would not spread to goods imported from Russia, the price increase would not affect many categories of goods. In 2022 and 2023, Russia accounted for a total of 94% share in trade. The new tariff will only apply to goods imported from third countries, which account for only 5% of total trade.

Personnel Changes in “Intelligence Service”

On March 1, 2024, Alan Gagloyev released Aleksey Varziyev from the post of the Head of the so-called Foreign Intelligence Service. Varziyev was appointed to this post by Gagloyev's predecessor in 2017. His main responsibility was to conduct intelligence activities on the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia.

Another Warning to Residents of “Border” Villages

On March 12, the so-called State Security Committee called on the population living near the occupation line to prevent the movement of domestic animals onto the territory controlled by the Georgian authorities since they believe that livestock movement increases risks of biological contamination of animals and the transfer of pathogens. According to the Committee, there are cases when the owners themselves turn to people living on the territory controlled by the Georgian authorities to help them return their animals. This is not the first time such a warning has been sounded.

Ergneti 118th Meeting  

On March 20, the 118th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting was held in the village of Ergneti. This is the second meeting this year, the first took place on February 13. The Georgian side spoke about the illegal process of “borderization,” the continued illegal detention of six Georgian citizens and the investigation into the murder of Tamaz Ginturi. As the Georgian side reported, a total of five “borderization” cases have been recorded since January 1, 2024. A representative of the Tskhinvali side raised the issue of the “border” demarcation and the removal of the Georgian police post in the village of Tsnelisi. The representative also spoke about the increasing cases of violation of the “border” and airspace by unmanned aerial vehicles.

The next meeting will be held on May 16, and the technical meeting on water irrigation will be held on April 26.

Ergneti 118th Meeting  

Putin's “Elections”

On March 15-17, 2024, the Russian presidential elections were also held in the occupied regions. During the run-up to the elections, the de facto authorities of both regions expressed open support for the incumbent Russian President Vladimir Putin. On March 12, a rally in support of Putin, organized by Alan Gagloyev’s Nykhas Party, was held in Tskhinvali. Gagloyev also participated in the rally. On March 12, a pro-Putin youth forum was held in Sokhumi, which was also attended by representatives of the de facto government. Residents of the occupied regions with Russian citizenship took part in the elections. There was a total of 30 polling stations in Abkhazia, and 12 - in the Tskhinvali region.

Vladimir Putin's Supporters’ Rally in Tskhinvali

In Abkhazia, up to 39 thousand people supported Putin which is 93.96% of the voters. In the Tskhinvali region this number totaled 16,109 people which makes up 95.68% of the total voters. At foreign polling stations, Higher support than in the occupied regions was only recorded in Turkmenistan.

Terrorist Attack in Moscow

The occupied regions responded to the terrorist attack that occurred on March 22 at Crocus City Hall in Moscow. March 24 was declared a mourning day in Abkhazia. Aslan Bzhania extended condolences to Putin. On March 26, during his visit to Moscow, Bzhania made an entry in the book of condolences at the Russian Foreign Ministry. Alan Gagloyev, who took part in a mourning ceremony at the Russian Embassy in Tskhinvali, also extended condolences to Putin. In Moscow, the de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tskhinvali region, Akhsar Jioev, made an entry in the book of condolences. March 24 was declared a mourning day in the Tskhinvali region.

Mourning Event in Tskhinvali